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ABSTRACT
Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) such as pacemakers and neu-
rostimulators are highly constrained in terms of energy. In addition,
the wireless-communication facilities of these devices also impose
security requirements considering their life-critical nature. How-
ever, security solutions that provide considerable coverage are gen-
erally considered to be too taxing on an IMD battery. Consequently,
there has been a tendency to adopt ultra-lightweight security prim-
itives for IMDs in literature. In this work, we demonstrate that the
recent advances in embedded computing in fact enable the IMDs
to use more mainstream security primitives, which do not need to
compromise significantly on security for fear of impacting IMD
autonomy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many battery-powered implantable medical devices (IMDs) are
designed to operate for around ten years while implanted in the
body. In order to prolong battery life, traditionally there has been a
tendency to opt for less demanding and simple medical-application
implementations and underlying hardware. This is especially im-
portant given the safety-critical nature of these devices and their
extreme reliability and availability demands. Unfortunately, until
very recently, the above tendency resulted in less focus on the
security aspects of IMDs given the notorious nature of the secu-
rity solutions in terms of additional energy costs. Security, as a
requirement, has been systematically ignored – or at the very least,
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postponed – despite the fact that IMDs have been increasingly
getting equipped with wireless connectivity to the outside world.
Over the last decade or so, numerous vulnerabilities have been
found in IMDs due to their lack of security [2, 6]. Consequently,
there has been a significant ramp up in the number of solutions
proposed in literature to strengthen IMD security. However, due
to the stringent energy constraints of IMDs, most of the focus has
been on developing lightweight security solutions [6, 10]. This en-
ergy efficiency, however, comes at the cost of not adopting more
mainstream and well-scrutinized solutions. One significant down-
side of this trend is that the proposed solutions do not provide
the fundamental security services, which one would expect to be
provided in life-critical systems such as IMDs. What is more, adopt-
ing well-established solutions would benefit re-certification of now
more secure implants through wide-spread security techniques.
From the CIANA1 security-service model, confidentiality, in-
tegrity and authentication between the IMD and an external reader/-
programmer are addressed through the use of lightweight block
ciphers in most of the recent work on IMD security [10]. However,
these symmetric primitives, by definition, do not provide true non-
repudiation, and require a pre-shared key between the reader and
IMD. Asymmetric (or public-key) cryptography primitives, which
do not have such issues, have been generally avoided in the case
of IMDs for two reasons: They require the use of certificates and
a public key infrastructure (PKI) in order to protect against man-
in-the-middle (MITM) attacks and they are generally considered
to be too taxing on the battery [10]. Regarding the first reason,
IMDs do not have sufficient on-board memory and lack an Internet
connection to track the validity of the reader certificates [6]. This,
however, can be addressed by employing a policy that establishes
proximity between the IMD and the reader in order to get rid of the
need for certificates. This principle, which is called touch-to-access,
ensures that only the entity that can physically touch the patient is
allowed access to the IMD [9]. The underlying assumption is that
the attacker cannot get in close proximity to the IMD since the
patient would reject prolonged physical contact with strangers.
In order to address the second reason, we evaluate in this arti-
cle the effect of employing both symmetric (lightweight and non-
lightweight) and asymmetric cryptographic primitives on the IMD
battery life. We perform this evaluation on a modern ultra-low-
power ARM Cortex-M0+ based MCU [3], which is certainly eligible
for use in IMDs. This MCU has a dedicated peripheral for crypto-
graphic acceleration, which is used here on purpose for adding a
comparison of hardware-based implementations in the measure-
ments. As an example, we use an ISO/IEC 9798-2-based, three-pass
mutual authentication protocol (MAP) between the reader and
1CIANA: Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication, Non-repudiation and Availability
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Figure 1: Cost of one MAP session with respect to the choice
of cryptographic primitive
IMD [10]. The protocol employs a symmetric cipher for confidential-
ity, integrity and authentication and assumes a shared key between
the two entities. Similarly to [10], we use separate MCUs for exe-
cuting the primary medical functionality and security tasks, respec-
tively. This dual-processor architecture helps in handling repeated
communication requests, which otherwise may block the implant
from performing its primary functionality. Figure 1 shows the costs
of one MAP session when using different cipher implementations
for the MCU clock frequency of 19MHz. One MAP session involves
the reader sending a 32-bit command and the implant replying with
a 64-bit response. In this evaluation we executed C implementa-
tions of two lightweight block ciphers SPECK and MISTY1, and a
non-lightweight – yet widely-used – AES-128 on the MCU’s CPU.
We also executed the protocol by running AES-128 on the dedicated
peripheral. The wireless-communication energy numbers are based
on an implantable-grade transceiver [8], with an assumed effective
data rate of 265 kbps . We see that the software implementation
of AES-128 consumes more energy compared to the lightweight
ciphers. However, the dedicated hardware implementation of AES-
128 consumes the lowest energy across the board. To demonstrate
the impact of public-key cryptography, we use Elliptic-curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) for establishing the 128-bit shared symmetric key
for MAP. For instance, when using the secp256r1 curve, executing
ECDH key exchange on the dedicated peripheral before starting the
MAP protocol adds 1457 µJ to the security energy budget needed.
Undoubtedly, this is a significant increase, and somewhat justifies
the above-mentioned hesitance of not employing public-key cryp-
tography in IMDs. However, to holistically study the impact on
the IMD lifetime, the usage pattern of the IMDs and the battery
capacity should be taken into account. Figure 2 shows the impact of
different MAP implementations on the battery lifetime compared to
the case of having no security at all, for different implantable-grade
battery sizes. The medical-functionality-MCU duty cycle is set to
5% (active vs. sleep mode), which is in line with a typical pacemaker
design [5]. The communication-session duration is set as 2 min-
utes per day to match an actual reader-IMD session [7]. However,
the active-transmission is pessimistically enabled throughout the
session for worst-case numbers. We observe that MAP based on
the hardware implementation of AES-128 performs best in terms
of IMD longevity. Moreover, the additional cost of ECDH for key
exchange is insignificant in the context of IMD lifetime since it is
required only once before each daily transmission.
When it comes to availability, protection against battery Denial-
of-Service (bDoS) attacks is of extreme significance given their
low cost and high likelihood in the context of IMDs. In bDoS, the
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Figure 3: Required ZPD capacitance and charging time
attacker forces the IMD to run an energy-consuming task (such
as authentication), by e.g., sending continuous communication re-
quests, with the aim of depleting its battery. One effective technique
against this attack is zero-power defense (ZPD) [2], in which the
IMD harvests the RF energy from the initiator’s communication
messages and utilizes this free energy to perform authentication.
Only after successful authentication does the IMD switch to bat-
tery power. The simplest configuration of ZPD employs a capacitor
that first stores the required energy and then performs authentica-
tion [1]. The use of non-lightweight encryption primitives discussed
above may require a large capacitance size due their high energy
consumption. This can potentially increase the IMD size and also
impact real-time performance due to the charging delay. However,
we find that the required capacitance size for AES-128-based MAP
along with ECDH results in roughly 460 µF (see Figure 3), which is
within the range of commercial ceramic capacitors2. The minimum
and maximum capacitor voltages are set to 2.1 V and 3.3 V , respec-
tively. By choosing a standard available size of 470 µF and using
the wireless-power-transfer scheme from [4] as an example (which
delivers 6.15mW ), the charging delay results in 416 ms, which does
not have a practical impact in IMD functionality or availability.
2 RESULT AND CONCLUSION
Based on the findings in this work, we conclude that compromising
security-service coverage by choosing a lightweight solution is not
a recommended move considering the current state of the art of
ultra-low-power embedded computing. Our recommendation is to
focus more on extending this coverage and less on the impact on
battery life, since our results show that modern MCUs allow the
use of mainstream primitives in an energy-efficient manner.
2Ceramic capacitors have a low leakage current, small size and low cost and hence are
ideal for energy harvesting [1].
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